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Abstract. This paper presents estimates of individuals’ responses in hourly wages to changes 
in marginal tax rates. Estimates based on register panel data of Swedish households covering 
the period 1992 to 2007 produce significant but relatively small net-of-tax rate elasticities. 
The results vary with family type, with the largest elasticities obtained for single males and 
the smallest for married/cohabitant females. Despite these seemingly small elasticities, 
evaluation of the effects of a reduced state tax using a microsimulation model shows that the 
effort effect matters. The largest effect is due to changes in number of working hours yet 
including the effort effect results in an almost self-financed reform. As a reference to the 
earlier literature we also estimate taxable income elasticities. As expected, these are larger 
than for the hourly wage rates. However, both specifications produce significantly and 
positive income effects. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Feldstein (1995 and 1999) broadens the analysis of taxes beyond the traditional measures of 
labour supply.  In this broader approach the key variable is taxable income and the argument 
is that the response of this variable to the income tax rate captures all of the important 
responses to taxation.  Meghir and Phillips (2009) refer to this approach as “the new tax 
responsiveness literature” and provide a short review of the main findings; the studies based 
on the broader income measure often produce larger or even much larger incentive effects 
compared to those found in the traditional labour supply literature.  
 In contrast to the findings in the international literature, studies based on Swedish data 
often report lower tax responses; see Gelber (2008), Hansson (2007), Holmlund and 
Söderström (2008), Ljunge and Ragan (2006) and Selén (2005). An interesting contribution is 
given by Blomquist and Selin (2008), who not only focus on a broader income measure but 
also use hourly wage rate as an alternative. Based on a sample from 1981 to 1991 on married 
males and females, they obtain large net-of-tax elasticities for females – in the range of 1-1.4 
for taxable income and about half that size for hourly wages.  
 The main purpose of our paper is to estimate hourly wage rate elasticities and to use 
these estimates together with labour supply responses for a tax policy evaluation. The tool for 
the evaluation is a microsimulation model, SWEtaxben, developed in order to evaluate the 
impact of tax and benefit changes on Swedish household; see Ericsson and Flood (2009). 
Since models for labour supply are already implemented in SWEtaxben, this paper 
concentrates on the estimation of hourly wage effects. Apart from presenting estimates on 
hourly wage rates, results based on taxable income are included as a reference to earlier work.  
In contrast to Blomquist and Selin, who used survey data from 1981 to 1991, our data are 
based on a large register based panel from 1992 to 2007. 
 The evaluated reform consists of a reduction in the state tax (central governmental tax) 
– before the reform about 20 percent of the taxpayers paid this tax and we increase the tax 
brackets so that only about 10 percent do so after the reform. The evaluation is presented as a 
pure static, or first-round effect, as well as a second-round effect allowing for behavioural 
changes. The second-round effect is decomposed into an effect on hours of work as well as on 
hourly wages. According to the results, the wage (effort) effect matters but is smaller than the 
labour supply effect. 
 Section 2 below presents a short review of the literature on the net-of-tax elasticity for 
different income variables including one study based on hourly wages. The focus is on the 
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papers using Swedish data. Section 3 describes our data and also includes a description of 
changes in wages, working hours and taxes during the period of estimation. Section 4 presents 
the model and the method used for estimation and also includes the results given as net-of-tax 
and virtual income elasticities. Section 5 gives a short description of the microsimulation 
model SWEtaxben (Swedish tax/benefit model) used for the policy evaluation. Section 6 
summarizes the evaluation of a decreased state tax. The final section summarizes the results. 
An appendix presents results based on similar methods as in Blomquist and Selin. 
2. Previous work 
 A recent review of the “new” literature is given in Meghir and Phillips (2009) and in 
Saez et al. (2009). Table 1 below provides a subsample of the studies discussed in these 
sources.   
 Although not the first study, Feldstein (1995) set the standard for many studies to 
follow. His variable of interest is based on taxable income and he utilizes a two-period panel 
of married couples to analyse the impact of the 1986 US tax reform. Arguing that the tax 
reform could be regarded as a natural experiment, he uses a standard difference-in-differences 
technique. His results indicate large tax responses – an elasticity of taxable income between 
1.1 and 3.05, the largest effect being for individuals with higher income.  
 Sillamaa & Veall (2000) based their study on a Canadian tax reform. Their main 
contribution is a detailed breakdown by source of income, and the results demonstrate a lack 
of robustness. Using taxable income based on employment produced an elasticity of 0.22 and 
the corresponding result for income from self-employment was over one. Further, selecting 
the sample based on higher income produced elasticities well above one. 
 Goolsbee (2000) verified the lack of robustness in another dimension, namely the kind 
of reform evaluated.  He used the same approach for a number of US reforms from 1922 to 
1989, and the elasticity varies considerably across the different reforms.  
 According to Meghir and Phillips, the paper by Gruber and Saez (2002) represents the 
most comprehensive study in this literature and discusses several potential problems. Firstly, 
the data span a large number of different US reforms. Secondly, they use past income as a 
way of getting around the mean reversion problem, i.e. that individuals adjust their initial 
income regardless of changes in taxes, and they also predict the tax rate based on past income 
as an instrumental variable. Thirdly, they include controls for the increasing income 
distribution and finally they derive an income effect in close analogy with the structural 
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labour supply approach. The results show a taxable income elasticity of 0.4 on average and 
0.57 for high income earners. 
 (Table 1 about here) 
 Saez et al. (2009) presents a number of studies based on Swedish data, below in Table 
2, we extend the list and to the best of our knowledge this table covers all available studies. 
One reflection is that there is a surprisingly large amount of recent papers based on Swedish 
data. One reason for this might be access to high-quality register data and another is that 
Sweden has experienced such dramatic changes in the tax systems, the prime example being 
the major tax reform in 1991. All studies, except one, are based on the administrative LINDA 
data and most of them utilize the 1991 “tax reform of the century” to identify tax responses.  
 Sélen (2002) uses similar methods as in Feldstein (1995) but is much more ambitious 
concerning test of robustness. A large number of different income definitions and model 
specifications are evaluated and also an income effect is estimated. The estimated net-of-tax 
elasticity for a specification including initial income as well as an income effect is 0.41 and 
the corresponding income elasticity is 0.27. Ljunge & Ragan (2006) use earned income and 
estimate a static and dynamic model also both extensive as well as intensive margins are 
included. They report large responses to the 1991 year tax reform, with elasticities of about 
0.35 on the intensive margin. Hansson (2007) estimates the elasticity of earned taxable 
income using two different approaches and a number of control variables and the 1991 tax 
reform. The elasticity estimates for the preferred specification fall in the range of 0.4–0.5. 
 Gelber (2008) uses a family model, where spouses consider each other’s net-of-tax 
rates, and analyze responses to the 1991 reform. The estimates imply that husbands’ and 
wives’ leisure are complements. They test and reject the standard labour supply specification, 
in which one spouse reacts to the other spouse’s income as if it were unearned income. 
Holmlund & Söderström (2008) use a panel including the 1991 reform but also a period 
thereafter. They estimate dynamic models and differ between short-run and long-run effects.  
The estimates of the long-run elasticity of income with respect to the net-of-tax rate are in the 
range of 0.2-0.3 and the short-run elasticities are smaller. An interesting contribution is that 
they do not stop at estimation elasticities but also use these for a tax reform evaluation. Due to 
the dynamic effects a reduction of the top marginal tax rate by five percent does not decrease 
tax revenues.  
 Blomquist & Selin (2008) use a panel data set from 1981 to 1991. This period covers a 
number of tax reforms thus providing a rich variability (decrease) in marginal tax rates.  An 
important contribution is the derivation of virtual income, which provides a closer link to a 
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structural model, and this is also the only study that, apart from taxable income, uses hourly 
wage rate as the dependent variable. An alternative definition of instrumental variables, to 
account for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates, is also suggested. The hourly wage rate 
elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate is estimated to 0.14-0.16 for males and 0.41-0.57 
for females. The uncompensated taxable labour income elasticities are 0.21 for men and 0.96-
1.44 for women.  
 (Table 2 about here) 
 All the studies, with one exception, cover a similar period – before the tax reform and 
most often a short period thereafter. This might be a reason why the net-of-tax rate results 
seem to be rather stable, around 0.2-0.5, across the studies. The exception is Blomquist and 
Selin, who obtain much larger effects for women. Possible explanations are that they use 
different data with a much smaller sample size but also a different choice of instrument as 
well as an alternative definition of virtual income. Also, note the small effects obtained by 
Holmlund and Söderström. This result is obtained despite the fact that they focus on high-
income (above median) earners.  A plausible reason is that they use data covering a period 
after the 1991 reform. The tax variation after the reform was much smaller than before, and 
the major change in the tax system utilized by Holmlund and Söderström was the increase in 
the top marginal tax rate by five percentage points in 1995.  
The next section presents the data used in our study, introduces important definitions 
and presents descriptive statistics.  
3. Wages, hours and taxes – definitions and stylized facts 
 
Access to income and hourly wage data of high quality is a prerequisite for this kind of 
analysis and we argue that this request is fulfilled in an almost ideal way by the LINDA 
register data.2
                                                          
2 See Edin and Fredriksson (2000). 
 Since measurement of hourly wages plays a crucial role, a detailed description 
of this variable is provided. The starting point is information about individuals’ monthly 
income given a full working-time contract; this information is provided by the employer. 
Next, hourly wage rate is obtained by dividing the measure of monthly income by number of 
working hours, given a standard full-time contract (165 hours per month).  Thus, our measure 
of hourly wages does not suffer from measurement errors which would be the case had we 
divided by a measure of self-reported working hours. Measurement errors in hours would then 
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spill over to errors in wage rates and cause a spurious correlation between wages and hours.3
Apart from wages (W) we also construct yearly working hours (H).  Two sources of 
information are available: information from the employer and information on yearly earnings 
from administrative tax registers. Information from the employer gives the working hour’s 
contract expressed as a percentage of a full-time contract. A problem with this measure is that 
it is not directly related to actual working hours. The implication is that there is very little 
variation especially in male working hours. For this reason the measure of hours used in this 
paper is obtained by dividing the measure of annual labour income (W*H) by the wage rate 
(W).  
 
In contrast, the measure used here is not vulnerable to this problem, since we use a constant as 
a divisor, i.e. 165. Thus, any remaining measurement errors in hourly wage rate should be 
uncorrelated to measurement errors in working hours.  
Despite the advantage of our data there are also some potential problems. As mentioned 
above the wage information is given by the employer and there is a low degree of non-
response. Since this non-response is concentrated to employers with few employees, this 
causes a potential problem of selectivity. For instance, self-employed can be more responsive 
towards economic incentives; see Blow and Preston (2002). It seems reasonable that under-
representing small firms or self-employed implies underestimating the responsiveness of 
changes in tax and benefits. Another problem is that the information from the employers has 
been collected during one month in contrast to the annual measure of income. Of course 
conditions might have changed during the year, e.g. an individual might have changed jobs or 
working hours. This could create a problem with our measures of both W and H. To reduce 
this problem a restriction has been imposed implying that individuals with large differences in 
income according to the two utilized sources of information, i.e. the employer’s records and 
the tax registers, have been deleted. Also for this reason individuals working very long hours 
have been dropped, by using a limit of 4 000 hours/year (however, very few individuals are 
excluded for this reason). Given these caveats our claim is that the measures of W by 
construction provide an almost ideal base for the study of effects on taxes. 
Another advantage of the data used is that they form a panel. Since there is no problem 
of non-response in LINDA, attrition is not a problem. Furthermore, LINDA represents a 
random sample of almost three percent of the Swedish population. This sample size is an 
                                                          
3 For a presentation of measurement problems in working hours, see Selén (1995). 
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important advantage in the estimation methods used, especially regarding the possibility of 
choosing valid instruments.  
 Since the main idea is to study the effect of taxes on effort, individuals who work short 
hours, less than 1 000 hours/year or not at all, have been excluded. Note that number of 
working hours has been used for these selections but is not used in the model that has been 
estimated. After these selections, an unbalanced panel where an individual must be included 
in an uninterrupted sequence of at least three years, from 1992 to 2007, has been created, 
including a total of almost 700 000 observations.  
 The data used span a different period compared to in Blomquist and Selin. They used 
data before and after the major Swedish tax reform in 1991 and utilized only two time 
periods, i.e. 1980 and 1991, for the estimation (however an intermediate year was used for 
obtaining a measure of taxable income). There are both pros and cons to these two 
approaches. We use a much larger sample of annual data that covers a longer period but do 
not include a dramatic tax change. The introduction of an in-work tax credit in 2007 might be 
considered as a large tax change, yet is not at all comparable to the tax reform in 1991. Thus, 
the reform in 1991 can help identify the tax effect but at the same time such a reform 
represents something extraordinary and this can also create a problem.  The reform in 1991 
has been called “the tax reform of the century” and covered a whole range of tax changes and 
not only income taxes. It is not obvious that such a dramatic change is ideal if the purpose is 
to estimate parameters that are used for predicting future responses to changes in a tax and 
benefit system. On the other hand the tax changes after the reform have been more modest 
and this might create a problem of identifying any effects at all from the tax system. However, 
using data from such a long period still includes a lot of changes and we argue that this 
variation provides us with enough information. For a detailed description of the changes in the 
tax system during this period, see Tax Statistical Yearbook of Sweden (2007) and Hansson 
(2006). The most important changes are mentioned below. 
 Figure 1 shows the distribution in working hours in 2007. Note that the lower and upper 
cut-off points at 1 000 and 4 000 respectively have only a minor effect. As expected, females 
have a higher frequency of lower hours and males of higher hours.  
 (Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 2 shows the corresponding information for hourly wage rates. Again the shape is 
as expected – a higher frequency of high wages for males and a higher concentration of 
females in the lower wage range. No lower cut-off has been used but all wages higher than 
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600 SEK have been deleted. Of course the influence of this upper wage truncation has been 
tested in our estimates and as expected the effect is very small. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 Table 3 shows the average levels for some of the variables of importance, and Figure 3 
presents the rate of changes in these variables. Note the strong increase in real wages, almost 
50 percent, from 1992 to 2007. These rates are similar regardless of gender, but as shown in 
Table 3 the level is higher for males. In 1992 the mean number of yearly working hours was 
2 152 for males and 1 811 for females. Figure 3 shows decreasing hours for males and an 
increase for females. By comparison to labour force survey data, these figures might seem 
high and it might also look surprising that the recession in the early 1990s did not have much 
effect. However, the sample used for the analyses comprises individuals working at least 
1 000 hours a year. The decrease in working hours for males after 1995/96 must be explained 
by other factors than the business cycle. For females the trend is increasing and also for the 
last years it is increasing for males as well.  
 (Table 3 about here) 
 The change in marginal tax rates depends mainly on changes in labour income and 
changes in tax rules.  In 1992 the mean marginal tax rate was about 41 percent for males and 
almost 35 percent for females. The changes displayed in Figure 3 show a strong increase for 
females reaching a peak in 1999 and for males a few years earlier. This is partly explained by 
the increase in taxes due to a political agreement following the severe recession in the early 
1990s but also to ”bracket creep”, i.e. more individuals are exposed to higher tax brackets as a 
result of inflation. Other important changes include the introduction of a social security 
contribution in 1993 and an increase of the highest state tax to 25 percent in 1995. After this 
initial period of increased taxes and social contributions a long period follows with gradually 
decreasing taxes. In 2007 an in-work tax credit was introduced, which explains the drop in 
marginal tax rate displayed in Figure 3.  
(Figure 3 about here) 
The importance of an increasing income distribution has been stressed in the literature. 
It is possible that an increase in taxation is caused by an increase in the highest income, and if 
this increase is caused by factors unrelated to taxes, then this must be controlled for in the 
estimation. In order to demonstrate the importance of this argument, Figure 4 displays the 
change in wage distribution. The two upper lines show the 90th percentile divided by the 10th, 
with the upper line for males and the lower for females. Thus, in 1992 the male wage rate at 
the 90th  percentile was about 1.9 times higher than at the 10th percentile and in 2007 this ratio 
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had increased to about 2.2, yielding an increase by 14.5 percent; the corresponding increase 
for females was 18.4 percent.  Measured as the ratio of the third and first quintile the increase 
is smaller, 6.9 and 8.1 for males and females, respectively.  
(Figure 4 about here) 
Figure 5 displays the covariation of hourly wages and working hours. Working hours 
are ranked from decile one to decile ten and the average hourly wage rate has been calculated 
for each decile. It follows that the wage levels are much lower at working hours in decile one 
compared to decile ten. For females there is a clear trend, the wage rate increases with 
working hours. For males this pattern is not so clear, note for instance the high level of male 
wages at the third decile. 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 The next section explains the statistical model for estimation of wage (and taxable 
income) elasticities.  
4. The hourly wage rate model 
 
The traditional labour supply literature regards the hourly wage rate as given and analyses 
only the hours of work response. However, there are many reasons why hourly wages may 
change as a result of changes in taxes. Instead of working hours, the ”new” literature focuses 
on the effort dimension. An individual can increase his effort but still work the same number 
of hours. The increased effort can take different forms, such as accepting a management 
position, accepting working inconvenient hours, moving to a higher paid job or investing in 
human capital. The purpose of the model derived in this section is to estimate the individual 
response to changes in net-of-tax and virtual income on hourly wage rate. The assumption is 
that this effect captures the effort dimension.  
 Gruber and Saez (2002) derived a taxable income model analogous to a traditional 
labour supply model. An individual maximizes utility by choosing consumption, C, and 
taxable income, I, subject to a budget constraint C= (1-t) I+y, where t is marginal tax rate on a 
linear segment and y is virtual income on that same segment. Virtual income represents the 
intersection of the individual´s extended budget segment in consumption-effort space with the 
Y-axis.  The optimal solution expresses taxable income as a function of net-of-tax rate and 
virtual income.  Blomquist and Selin modified this approach by defining virtual income 
analogously to the labour supply literature assuming a piece-wise linear budget set.  
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 The model used for the analysis of hourly wage rate resembles the model for taxable 
income (for details see Blomquist and Selin). As a starting point, assume that individuals 
maximize utility according to U=U(C, E, H), where E is effort and H hours of work. Taxable 
income in the budget constraint above is replaced by a wage function multiplied by hours, 
where the wage function, w(E, z), is a function of effort and individual characteristics z.  
 The optimal wage rate is derived as a linear approximation of net-of-tax rate and virtual 
income. Including individual characteristics z, the wage equation is given as 
  
 ln(Wit) = β1 ln(1-tit )+ β2 ln(yit )+ β3z1it + … + βkzkit + εit, 
 
where W denotes gross wage rate and the z-variables apart from individual characteristics also 
include time effects. We use a somewhat different definition of virtual income than Blomquist 
and Selin and write  y = WHt-T, where T is total tax4
Meghir and Phillips (2009) summarize many of the challenges that have to be solved in 
order to provide reliable estimates. An obvious challenge is caused by the fact that effort in 
contrast from working hours cannot be observed, which prevents estimation of structural 
models based on economic theory. A common method of estimation is based on ”difference-
in-difference” and ideally, given the assumption of a natural experiment, any significant 
difference can be interpreted as a causal effect, i.e. that a change in taxes has caused a change 
in taxable income (or hourly wage rates). 
. Given data that include enough 
variation in taxes, the parameters can be estimated and the parameters of importance, β1 and 
β2, produce the net-of-tax and virtual income elasticities. 
 Unfortunately, tax reforms are often not in accordance with the assumption underlying a 
natural experiment. A tax change often applies to all taxpayers and there is no control group. 
Instead all individuals are part of the treatment group, and this causes considerable problems 
both in estimation and in interpretation.5
 The approach used in this paper is not based on the difference-in-difference method but 
is instead closely related to the method used in Gruber and Saez (2002). They used an 
 The practical implementation of the difference-in-
difference method becomes a comparison before and after a tax change. The control group 
comprises all individuals before the change and the treatment group the same individuals after 
the change. 
                                                          
4 For details, see MaCurdy et al. (1990). 
5 A review of the literature is given in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). For a critical assessment, see e.g. Deaton 
(2009).  
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unbalanced panel covering several different reforms and then constructed changes between 
pairs of years. They used a three-year time difference and stacked all these differences into 
one single dataset. In contrast, as our baseline approach we construct an unbalanced panel 
from 1992 to 2007 and use fixed effect estimation. 
 Gruber and Saez highlight the importance of controlling for secular changes in the 
income distribution. One reason is mean reversion – high (low) incomes in the initial year 
tend to be lower (higher) in the following year, producing a negative (positive) correlation 
between the error term and income during the first year. The second reason is that an increase 
in the distribution of income (in our case hourly wages) implies higher taxes. Thus, if there is 
a trend towards an increasing income (wage) distribution for reasons other than changes in 
taxes, this will lead to an increase in the number of individuals with high taxable income and, 
thus, due to the progressivity in the income tax system to more people paying high marginal 
tax rates. This correlation between the error term and income (wages) causes a problem. It is 
therefore necessary to include control variables in the regression. One suggestion has been to 
include lagged income and also a spline function in first period income. The knots in the 
spline are the income levels at the different deciles. Here we use dummy variables to control 
for income and wage decile in the initial year, and time dummies are also included.  
 Apart from the problem of mean reversion and increased income distribution there is 
also a problem of endogeneity. The net-of-tax rate as well as virtual income is a function of 
the dependent variable. The standard statistical method to solve this problem is to use 
instrumental variables. To define these instruments is a major challenge that occupies a large 
part of ”the new tax responsiveness literature”.  
 Two variants of instruments have been used in the present paper: lagged taxable income 
and predicted taxable income. Flood (1990) and Klevmarken (2000) suggested the use of 
lagged instead of current taxable income as an input for the tax calculations. The motivation 
apart from reducing the problem of endogeneity was that individuals do not know the current 
income until the end of the year, but instead use last year’s taxable income as a proxy in their 
tax calculations. However, since there is a high degree of inertia in taxable income, the main 
problem of endogeneity remains. As a result, an alternative definition was suggested in Carlin 
and Flood (1997), i.e. taxable income was calculated based on a predicted wage rate. The 
wage model utilized only individual and household characteristics, which solves or at least 
reduces the endogeneity problem.  The recent “new tax responsiveness literature” has often 
used instruments that are functions of lagged taxable income, typically taxable income from 
the first time period.  
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 Blomquist and Selin use a similar approach as Carlin and Flood and predict taxable 
income using exogenously individual/household variables but add to this a taxable income 
with a five year time difference. The first time period in Blomquist and Selin is 1981 and the 
last is 1991, and they use a measure of taxable income in the middle of this period, i.e. from 
1986.  
A possible drawback of using previous or later (with a long time difference) measures 
of taxable income is that this requires a balanced panel. A balanced panel covering a long 
period implies a non-representative cross-sectional sample. This problem would be serious in 
our approach since several household types will be estimated separately, for instance a long 
panel of single mothers creates a selective sample that creates problems of inference. In order 
to avoid this, our models are estimated based on an unbalanced panel. As a consequence, the 
predicted taxable income is based only on individual/household specific variables and no 
measure of previous or future taxable income is used. A taxable income model is estimated 
annually using as independent variables age, education, region, household composition and 
also interaction between some of these.  
 To summarize, the following instruments have been tested: (1) current year taxable 
income ( It), (2) with one year lag (It-1), (3) two years lag (It-2) and (4) predicted taxable 
income (𝐼). Of all these alternatives we only present the results based on the last method. The 
reason is that this method should minimize the problem of endogeneity.  
 In order to allow for heterogeneity in the parameters, separate models have been 
estimated for different family types: single mothers, single females and males and 
married/cohabit female and males. Individual and household characteristics such as age, age 
squared, education, interaction age and education, region, number of children and also age of 
children are included. The baseline method of estimation is fixed effects.  
 The estimated parameters, presented in Table 4, show a large variation in net-of-tax rate 
and virtual income elasticities among the different family types. Single-headed households 
have larger net-of-tax rate elasticities compared to married/cohabit. The strongest effect is 
obtained for single males (0.16) followed by single females (0.14) and single mothers (0.09). 
For married males the elasticity is smaller (0.05) and for females it is essentially zero. The 
virtual income elasticity is positive but small for all family types.  
(Table 4 about here) 
 How does our estimates compare to other results in the literature. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only reference using hourly wages is Blomquist and Selin. A comparison for 
married males and females shows that our estimated net-of-tax elasticities are much lower and 
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also that the virtual income elasticities are much larger. However there are many possible 
reasons for these differences and in Appendix II an attempt is made to replicate the results 
using similar methods as in Blomquist and Selin. The differences still remain and one possible 
reason is that we use a different period that does not include large marginal tax reductions and 
the impact of the tax reform 1991. 
 Since most of the results in the literature are based on taxable income instead of hourly 
wages, Table 5 presents estimates of the taxable income elasticities. As expected, the 
estimated net-of-tax elasticities are larger than for the hourly wage model.  All single-headed 
households have elasticities in the range of 0.4-0.5. The figure is 0.11 for married/cohabitant 
males and, as before, almost zero for females. Ljunge and Ragan report an elasticity of 0.35 
(all individuals age 25-55, Linda data for the period 1989 to 1994 and Blomquist and Selin 
report 0.21 for males and 0.96-1.44 for females (married age 25-55, survey data for the time 
period 1981-1991).    
 (Table 5 about here) 
 In order to verify the robustness of our results, Table 6 presents the estimated elasticities 
for several alternative specifications. The first column presents the results of the baseline 
model, fixed effect estimation. In column 2 the model is estimated using random effects, and 
the main difference is somewhat larger elasticities. One reason for this difference could be 
lack of controls for unobserved heterogeneity. In accordance with the suggestion in 
Wooldridge (2002), we include the lagged dependent variable as a proxy for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The results in column 3 produce smaller elasticities compared to the baseline 
results without the lagged dependent variable, but the difference is not dramatic. In column 4 
estimation of the dynamic specification is repeated but now using random effects.  As 
confirmed by comparing columns 3 and 4, random effects and fixed effects produce 
approximately similar results. Next, we introduce controls for mean reversion by using initial 
values of the dependent variables. Since these variables have a high degree of collinearity 
with the lagged dependent variables, our specification includes only initial values instead of 
lagged ones. The results in column 5 are similar to the lagged dependent variables 
specification. Apart from mean reversion it is also important to include controls for changes in 
the distribution of income or wages. For this purpose, dummy variables are constructed 
measuring what decile the individual belonged to during the initial year. The results in column 
6 are similar to the corresponding results without these dummy variables. Finally, since many 
papers report results based on balanced panels, column 7 presents the elasticities for a model 
including initial values and decile dummies but using a balanced panel. There is no dramatic 
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difference caused by using a balanced panel. Note the similarity of these elasticities and the 
ones obtained for the baseline model. To conclude, the variation across models is relatively 
small.  
 (Table 6 about here) 
 Even if the size of the elasticities is informative it is still difficult to draw conclusions 
regarding the effects of changes in the tax and benefit rules. In order to evaluate these effects, 
the microsimulation model SWEtaxben will be used. This model will be explained below, but 
let us first briefly describe the data used for estimation. 
 5. SWEtaxben – a microsimulation model for the Swedish household 
 
Relating to the micro simulation literature, SWEtaxben can be labelled as a static micro 
simulation model with behavioural changes. Behaviour changes are measured in two 
dimensions, i.e. number of working hours and hourly wages (added in this paper). For 
working hours the behavioural response takes two different forms and uses two different types 
of models: first binary models that describe mobility in/out from non-work states such as old 
age pension, disability, unemployment, long term sickness, and second models that describe 
change in working hours and welfare participation. Thus, apart from the choice to work or not 
to work (extensive margin), working hours conditional on working (intensive margin) as well 
as welfare participation are treated as endogenous variables. For the wage dimension the 
responses are simulated using the estimated elasticities presented in this paper.  
 The data used for the simulations are based on the 2007 LINDA, from Statistics 
Sweden. The sample size corresponds to almost 8 percent of the Swedish population, thus, all 
the output is given with a high precision and, since the sampling weights are known, 
aggregate population measures can be produced.  
 The tax/benefit part of SWEtaxben is primarily a tool to calculate the households’ 
budget set. For the two-earner household the budget (disposable income or net income after 
tax and transfers) evaluated at observed working hours is given as  
(1) C=Im+If +Bs+Bh-Bc   where Ii = WiHi+Yi+Vi-t(Xi), i=m (male), f (female)              
Apart from hourly wages, Wi, and yearly number of working hours, Hi, Yi represents non-
earned taxable income (e.g. capital income, old age pension and benefits from unemployment, 
disability and long term sickness) and Vi non-earned non-taxable income (e.g. child 
allowance); t is a tax function defined on taxable income, Xi, (Xi= WiHi+Yi –Di where Di is 
deductions for work-related expenses or part of the premium for private pension savings). The 
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three means-tested (i.e. dependent on Hi) transfers considered are social assistance (Bs), 
housing allowance (Bh) and cost of child care (Bc). It is a considerable advantage that these 
systems are based on nationwide rules.  
In order to understand the sequential steps involved in the simulation, it is instructive 
to start by dividing the sample into the following subgroups: 
(1) Child, age 0-15, (2) Old age pensioner, age 61-, (3) Student, (4) Disability pensioner, age 
18-64, and old age pensioner after 64, (5) Parental leave, (6) Unemployed, age 18-64 and old 
age pensioner after 64, (7) Other (no income from states 2-6, 8, 9 but can have income from 
social assistance), (8) Long-term sick, age 18-64, and old age pensioner after 64 and (9) 
Working, age 18-70, and old age pensioner after 70. 
 This classification refers to a full time status during the base year (2007) and is 
primarily based on the main source of income. Individuals who got their main income from 
old-age pension are classified as pensioners, and so on. There are also some age related 
criteria that overrule the income source. Thus, all individuals younger than 16 are classified as 
child, and all individuals above 70 as old age pensioner. An individual can only be classified 
as disabled, unemployed or long-term sick up to age 64; above this age he is classified as an 
old age pensioner.  
 The main sequential steps are given in Figure 6. The first step (see Figure 6) involves 
the definition of a replacement rate for disability pension. The population at risk comprises 
individuals age 18-64 (but not older children living together with their parents) with a status 
of disabled/unemployed, long-term sick or working. For couples, at least one of the spouses 
has to belong to the population at risk. For each individual in this population, the tax/benefit 
module is called upon to calculate disposable income assuming that everyone is classified as 
being on full-time disability. Next, for the same individuals, income is calculated assuming 
full-time work (H=1800). The ratio disposable income from disability divided by disposable 
income from work defines the replacement rate. For instance, a replacement rate of 0.7 means 
that an individual who receives full-time compensation from disability insurance receives 70 
percent of the disposable income he would have received had he been a full time worker. A 
change in a tax/benefit that has an effect on the replacement rate will also have an effect on 
the probability of entering, staying in, or exiting from disability.  
 (Figure 6 about here) 
 Given the replacement rate, as well as all other explanatory variables included in the 
model, the probability of disability is calculated. In the calculation of this probability two 
stochastic terms enter: first a random draw from a normal distribution (with an estimated 
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mean and variance) representing individual heterogeneity and second a Monte Carlo 
experiment. If the simulated probability is less than a random draw from a uniform (0-1) 
distribution, then the event takes place; i.e. the individual is classified as disabled. Individuals 
not classified as disabled get the temporary status (10) and enter the next stochastic model in 
the sequence. Note that the random errors for each individual are the same before and after a 
reform. The Monte Carlo experiment acknowledges the fact that even individuals whose 
characteristics are such that the likelihood of disability are very low still face the risk of “bad 
luck”. With appropriate changes the same argument also applies to an individual with a high 
systematic probability of disability. This stochastic experiment has been applied to all binary 
events in the model. 
 The next step involves unemployment and the population at risk is unemployed, long-
term sick or working and those with the temporary status. The steps undertaken are the same 
as for disability. Thus after this step the individuals in the risk population are classified either 
as unemployed or as being in the temporary state. However, an important difference is that a 
sub-model is used to classify individuals as half- or full-time unemployed. After this follows 
the long-term sick and the population at risk is now long-term sick or working and those in 
the temporary state. Again the same procedure is used and as a result of this module, 
individuals now belong to the status long-term sick or temporary. The final binary model 
concerns old age pension; the population at risk is old age pensioner, other or working and 
those with temporary status age 61-70. An individual younger than 61 is not eligible for old 
age pension and all individuals above the age of 70 are by default old age pensioners. Again 
after this step individuals are classified as old age pensioners or are in the temporary state.  
 After these binary models a simple imputation follows, where all individuals with the 
temporary status who before the reform belonged to one of the binary states, i.e. individuals 
who have exited one of the binary states without entering another, are imputed as entering the 
working state and are given a number of yearly working hours equaling 1 800. This concludes 
the first part of the model where the binary models are used. Next we will explain the 
imputation of working hours and social assistance. 
 Every individual in the risk population (status other or working) are considered as 
working or voluntarily non-working. Thus, this is the typical risk population in traditional 
labour supply studies. For every individual in this population the tax/benefit module is called 
upon repeatedly in order to evaluate the budget set. For individuals classified as singles this 
requires 14 calls (7 working classes with and without social assistance) and for couples the 
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creation of the budget set requires 98 calls (7*7*2)6
 At this stage of the simulation, every individual has a predicted status, predicted 
working hours and predicted welfare participation. After this the next step in the simulation is 
to use the estimated elasticities from the wage equation in order to simulate the wage 
responses. The population at risk comprises all individuals with positive hours of work before 
and after the reform. In these simulations the virtual income elasticity is set to zero and the 
only influence comes from the net-of-tax rate. The argument for this is that the virtual income 
gives a valid approximation only if the budget set is convex. The data used for estimation 
fulfilled approximately the convexity requirement, but this is not the case in the simulation. 
The reason for this is that the estimation was based only on the tax system, and this produces 
approximately a convex budget set. Once the benefit rules are incorporated in the calculation 
of the budget set this can produce non-convexities.  
. Note that for the couples at least one of 
the spouses should belong to the population at risk. Given the budget set and all other 
variables included in the labour supply models, working hours as well as the probability of 
social assistance are predicted. The stochastic experiment for those models involves draws 
from an extreme value distribution. Also, note that different models have been estimated 
depending on the family type.  
 A final step is to call the tax/benefit module again to get the predicted disposable 
income, calculated at the predicted values of working hours, social assistance and wages. 
Thus, this is the predicted disposable income for the individuals/households resulting from the 
tax/benefit rules. By changing these rules and repeating the simulation, disposable income 
before and after a reform can be compared. 
 Obviously, the results of the simulations are dependent on the econometric models and 
as mentioned above four econometric models are used to simulate the probability of 
disability, unemployment, long-term sickness and old age pension, and for the conditional 
labour supply different discrete choice models have been estimated for each family type. All 
of the binary models have been estimated as dynamic random-effects logit models. The data 
used for the estimation is a balanced LINDA panel from 2000-2006. The method used for the 
conditional labour supply models follows previous work by Van Soest (1995); the household 
model is described in Flood et al. (2004) and the model for the single-headed household in 
Flood et al. (2007). These models belong to the class of discrete choice model, and an 
advantage of this approach is that it allows us to include as many details regarding the budget 
                                                          
6 Of course in practice the tax/benefit module is evaluated 7 times for single and 49 times for spouses, and 
disposable income with and without social assistance is calculated each time. 
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set as needed and that it extends naturally into a household model, where husbands and wives 
jointly determine their labour supply.7
6. Tax reform evaluation 
 
In this section the model introduced above, SWEtaxben, extended by the hourly wage model, 
is used in order to evaluate a hypothetical tax reform. In recent years the Swedish 
Government has decreased taxes on earnings by introducing an earned income tax credit. The 
credit implies lower tax rates at lower incomes whereas for a median or high income the 
marginal tax rate is high.  For the income year 2010 there is a 20 percent central governmental 
tax on labour income in the income range 32 000-45 400 SEK per month and 25 percent on 
higher incomes. This high level of the central governmental tax on top of a proportional 
municipal tax – on average across all municipals of 31.7 percent – implies a highest marginal 
tax rate of 56.7 percent. This is one of the highest top rates of all OECD countries.  
 The tax change that we evaluate is in agreement with OECD recommendations and 
suggests a decrease in the central governmental tax. The tax is decreased by increasing the 
lower breakpoint (20%) from a yearly taxable income of 372 100 SEK to 480 000 SEK and 
the upper breakpoint (25%) from 532 800 SEK to 720 000 SEK. This reduces the number of 
taxpayers who pay the central governmental tax from 20 percent to about 10 percent. 
 The results are presented in Table 7. According to the first-round effects – no 
behavioural changes – tax revenues decrease by about 14.5 billion SEK. Included in this 
calculation is an expected increase in VAT as a result of an increase in disposable income. 
The second-round effect includes changes both in working hours and in hourly wages. First, 
including the effects on working hours improves the governmental budget by 8.4 billion SEK 
compared to the static evaluation. This effect is due to higher earnings caused by increased 
working hours, mainly due to an increase on the intensive margin. The increase in labour 
income results in increased tax revenues (3.6 billion) and payroll taxes (3.5 billion). 
Disposable income increases by 7.3 billion and this reduces transfer payments but also 
increases VAT (1.3 billion). Finally, the effects on effort or hourly wages results in a further 
improvement of the governmental budget by 2.9 billion. Again, this is due to increased labour 
income (3.4 billion), payroll taxes (1.1) and VAT (0.3).  
                                                          
7 For a detailed presentation of all models including the estimated parameters, see Ericson, Flood and Wahlberg 
(2009). 
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 The total effect of this 17.6 billion SEK tax cut on the central governmental budget is a 
deficit of 3.3 billion SEK. Thus, there are strong dynamic effects and the implied degree of 
self-financing is 78 percent. Of this, 58 percentage points comes from changes in working 
hours and 20 from changes in effort.  
   
 (Table 7 about here) 
7. Final discussion 
 Studies based on a broader measure of income like taxable income suggests that taxes 
has larger incentive effects compared to studies based on hours of work. Saez et. al (2009) 
clearly illustrate the importance of the size of elasticities on the design of the tax profile at 
higher income. Abstracting from the income effect the tax rate which maximizes revenues 
depends on taxable income elasticity (e) and the income distribution.  The optimal tax is given 
by 1/(1+a*e), where a is called the Pareto coefficient. This coefficient shows the income 
distribution at the top.8
 This simple illustration shows the importance of the size of the economic incentives in 
the design of the tax profiles. Obviously this highlights the importance of the precision in the 
estimated elasticities. As been discussed above the hourly wage elasticities estimated in our 
paper are relatively small compared to other studies. Several reasons for these results have 
been mentioned but it also raises an important issue discussed in Chetty (2009). His argument 
is that individuals do not change their behaviour due to small changes. The cost of adjustment 
is too high; Chetty use the term friction for this inertia or lack of response. Friction is a 
reasonable explanation for the often small reported elasticities in studies using data after the 
 According to Aaberge and Atkinsson (2008) the Pareto coefficient in 
Sweden (year 2005) is about two. This together with an assumed elasticity of 0,2 means that a 
highest marginal tax rate of 71 percent is optimal. As a comparison consider the highest 
marginal tax rate on earnings (municipal plus central government) at 56,7 percent, a payroll 
tax at 31,42 percent and an average VAT at 17,6 percent, this sum to 73 percent, which is in 
line with the optimal rate. However this is given an elasticity of 0,2, if instead a value of 0,4 is 
assumed this implies an optimal tax of only 56 percent. Since this illustration is related to high 
income earners even an elasticity of 0,4 is not considered high relative to the findings in the 
international literature. 
                                                          
8 The size of the Pareto coefficient depends on the share of the top percent of the top decile. For details see 
Atkinson (2004). A large coefficient implies a more equal distribution.  
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1991 tax reform data.  The tax changes after 1991 can be described by many small 
adjustments. The first major tax change was introduced in 2007, the earned income tax credit.  
However, this reform has been criticized for its complicated design and it has been argued 
that many individuals lack knowledge of it.9
The simple illustration of an optimal tax rate together with the evaluation based on an 
advanced microsimulation model shows that even small elasticities can generate substantial 
dynamic effects.  An important ambition in the development of SWEtaxben has been to 
minimize the risk of exaggerated behavioral effects. It can be argued that these effects 
probably are biased downward, both with respect to the labor supply effects as well as on 
hourly wages. If our estimates can be regarded as a lower limit and at the same time imply 
considerable dynamic effects, this is a strong argument for the need to consider behavioral 
effects in the design of the tax/benefit systems. Still, it is important to recognize the fact that, 
as usual, the elasticities are estimated with some uncertainty or lack of precision. The 
sensitivity analyses in this study illustrates that estimated elasticities are not unaffected by 
differences in data selection, estimation method and choice of instruments.  This sensitivity 
together with the ”the curse of precision” – small differences in estimated elasticities have 
large effects on the aggregated results such as tax revenues, hours of work and income – 
offers a great challenge in policy analysis.   
 This raises the importance issue of tax designs 
our understanding is that in order for a tax reform to have expected behavioural effects it 
should imply a substantial change but also a simple design. 
As far as we know SWEtaxben is the only microsimulation model that considers 
behavioral effects both in the hour and effort dimension. However, this generalization has 
been obtained under some unrealistic assumptions and simplifications. The labor supply 
model assumes that hourly wages are exogenous (independent of working hours) whereas in 
the hourly wage model this assumption is dropped. In principle, this inconsistency could be 
addressed by a model that consider the joint choice of hours and wage. One such framework 
is given in Aaberge et. al. (1995). The most important characteristic of this approach is that 
hourly wages and demand side restrictions are integrated with the choice of working hours. In 
this approach there is a potential for considering the joint effect of a tax change on wages and 
hours.  
A critique against the method used in this study as well as in Aaberge et. al is that they 
are based on structural models –models derived from an underlying utility function—and 
                                                          
9 See Anderson & Antelius (2010) 
21 
 
therefor sensitive towards the underlying assumptions. For this reason the focus recently has 
shifted towards evaluation based on the idea of a “natural experiment”. The advantage of this 
approach is robustness. However, a problem is that tax reforms quite often are far from the 
requirement needed for a natural experiment. If the reform is general and applicable for all tax 
payers then the distinction between treatment- and control group is difficult and this creates 
severe identification problems.  For evaluations of general as well as hypothetical reforms the 
need of structural models seems obvious. However, an important task for future research is to 
use the insight from the ”natural experiment” literature in order to validate structural models. 
Given that the structural model approach can be verified by less demanding natural 
experimental results increase the usefulness for micro simulation with behavioral responses as 
a useful tool for policy evaluation. 
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Figure 1 Distribution in working hours in 2007, by gender 
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Figure 2. Wage distribution in 2007 by gender 
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Figure 3. Changes in real wages, working hours and marginal taxes 1992-2007 
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Figure 5. Hourly wage rate and working hours. 
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Figure 6. Structure of SWEtaxben. 
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Model: Dynamic logit model 
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1. Single mothers, 2. Single females, 3. Single males, 4. Cohab 
Variables: Disposable income, leisure, age, education, region, nationality   
No 
Yes, 
h=0 
h≥0, social assistance  yes/no 
 Working hours, social assistance, occupational status and wages has been imputed for 
all individuals. In a final call to MINI-FASIT disposable income and other variables are 
calculated at optimal hours. 
 
No 
No 
Event: Old age pension 
Population at risk: Old age pension, other, working, 61-70 
Model: Dynamic logit model 
Variables: Year, age, education, region, initial value, nationality, gender, 
replacement  rate, income above the cap  
 
No 
Event: Imputation working hours. 
Population at risk: Individuals belonging to one of the states above and predicted to 
exit. 
Model: H=1 800 
 
MINI 
FASIT 
 
 
Tax/ 
benefit  
rules 
 
 
Disposable 
income 
Yes, 
h=0 
Yes, 
h=0 
Yes, 
h=0 
Event: Hourly wage rate 
Population at risk: Working before and after a reform 
Model: Reduced form panel wage equation estimated separable for the family types 
1. Single mothers, 2. Single females, 3. Single males, 4. Cohab male, 5. Cohab female 
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Table 1: Taxable and Total Income Elasticities (Subsample from Meghir & Phillips (2008)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Author (Date)  Data (Years)  Tax Change  Sample  Controls for Income 
Distribution and Mean 
Reversion  
Definition of Income  Elasticity Results  
Feldstein 
(1995)  
NBER Tax Panel 1985 
& 1988  
TRA 86  Married, non-aged non-S 
corp Income > $30k  
None  AGI Taxable Income  0.75 – 1.3 1.1 (‘lower 
income’) to 3.05 (‘higher 
income’)  
Sillamaa &  
Veall 
(2000) 
Canadian Longitudinal  
Admin Survey. 
1986 to 1989 
Canadian 
 TRA 88 
Federal Tax paid > $625 
 (Can) 
Aged 25 – 64 65+ 
Include log income in base 
 year. Instrumental Variables 
approach 
Gross Income  
Taxable Income 
Employment Income S/E 
Income 
High-Income GI 
 
0.25 
0.14 
0.22 
1.12 
1.30 
Goolsbee et al 
(2000)  
Tax Statistics (agg) 
1922 – 1989  
Various 
Reforms  
Income > $30k  None  Taxable Income  -1.3 to 2 depending on the 
reform  
Gruber & Saez 
(2002)  
NBER Tax Panel 1979 
to 1990  
ERTA 81 & 
TRA 86  
Same marital status in 
paired-years  
Include Log Income, trend 
effects and a 10 piece spline.  
‘Broad Income’ Taxable 
Income  
0.12 0.4 0.57 (high income) 
0.18 (low income)  
ERTA 81: Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981), TRA 86: Tax Reform Act (1986), (A)GI: (Adjusted) Gross Income. NBER: National Bureau of Economic Research. IRS: Internal Revenue 
Service. 
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Table 2: Taxable and Total Income Elasticities based on Swedish data 
 
 
Author 
(Date)  
Data (Years) Tax 
Change  
Sample  Controls for Income 
Distribution and Mean 
Reversion  
Definition of 
Income  
Elasticity Results 
Selén 2002  HINK 
1989 & 1992 
1991 Men age 25-55 Include log taxable income in 
base year. Diff-in-diff and the 
instrumental Variables 
approach 
Taxable income 
and other income 
concepts 
0.2-04 
Ljunge & 
Ragan (2006) 
LINDA 
1989 to 1994 
1991 Earned income SEK 
>60,000, Transfer income < 
50,000 
  
Age 25 – 55 
Include log income in base 
 year. Instrumental Variables 
approach 
Earned income 
 
0.35 
 
Hansson 
(2007)  
LINDA 
1989 & 1992 
1991 Taxable income > 0 1989 & 
1992 
Unchanged marital status and 
family size 
Age 25-60 
Include log taxable earning in 
base year. Diff-in-diff and the 
instrumental Variables 
approach 
Taxable earned 
income 
0.4-0.5 
Gelber 
(2008)  
LINDA 
1988-1991 
1991 Married couples 
age 18-65 
Earned income in base 
year>0 
No self employed 
Include log taxable earning in 
base year. First difference and 
the instrumental Variables 
approach 
Earned income 
Compensated  
husband 
wife 
 
 
0.25 
0.49 
Holmlund & 
Söderström 
(2008) 
LINDA 
1991-2002 
1991-2002 Taxable income above 
median base year 
Age 20-59 
Instruments based on two year 
lagged income. 
Taxable income 
Men 
Women 
 
Short:0.2 Long:0.1 
Short:-0.1 Long:0 
Blomquist & 
Selin 
(2008) 
LNU 
1981 &1991 
1981-1991 Married couples 
No selfemployed 
Aged 22-54 
Lagged taxable income 
Spline in lagged income 
Instruments based on 
predicted taxable income 
(including TI in the middle 
year.) 
Taxable income 
Men 
Women 
Hourly wage 
Men 
Women 
 
0.2-0.25 
0.9-1.4 
 
0.14-0.16 
0.4-0.6 
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Table 3. Hourly wages, marginal taxes and working hours 
 
Year Male Female 
 Hourly wage Marginal tax Yearly hours Hourly wage Marginal tax Yearly hours 
1992 119 41.29 2 152 99 34.84 1811 
1993 121 42.05 2 153 99 35.44 1819 
1994 124 45.44 2 154 101 35.59 1822 
1995 125 45.67 2 158 102 37.11 1816 
1996 131 46.58 2 139 106 37.98 1834 
1997 136 47.86 2 129 111 39.08 1837 
1998 139 47.24 2 112 115 39.41 1849 
1999 145 44.96 2 096 120 40.20 1848 
2000 152 44.51 2 087 124 39.71 1841 
2001 158 43.12 2 084 129 38.61 1847 
2002 159 41.54 2 078 131 37.23 1849 
2003 161 41.82 2 060 134 37.77 1838 
2004 162 42.21 2 056 136 38.17 1835 
2005 167 42.43 2 061 140 37.87 1830 
2006 173 43.02 2 069 145 38.29 1845 
2007 177 42.65 2 087 147 36.49 1 862 
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Table 4. Estimated hourly wage parameters 
Single Married Cohab
Single Mother female male Female Male
Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
lw Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Net-of-tax 0.0928 0.0104 0.1409 0.0056 0.1589 0.0051 0.0097 0.0031 0.0502 0.0034
Virtual 0.0245 0.0014 0.0267 0.0006 0.0376 0.0006 0.0201 0.0010 0.0578 0.0016
1994 0.0313 0.0037 0.0277 0.0022 0.0243 0.0031 0.0218 0.0012 0.0102 0.0020
1995 0.0513 0.0056 0.0400 0.0035 0.0272 0.0049 0.0414 0.0019 0.0222 0.0031
1996 0.0956 0.0079 0.0789 0.0048 0.0776 0.0068 0.0819 0.0026 0.0653 0.0043
1997 0.1458 0.0102 0.1210 0.0061 0.1138 0.0088 0.1275 0.0033 0.1020 0.0055
1998 0.1788 0.0125 0.1577 0.0075 0.1422 0.0107 0.1634 0.0040 0.1305 0.0067
1999 0.2289 0.0146 0.2011 0.0089 0.1709 0.0127 0.2114 0.0048 0.1638 0.0080
2000 0.2715 0.0168 0.2433 0.0102 0.2156 0.0146 0.2513 0.0055 0.2018 0.0092
2001 0.3179 0.0191 0.2844 0.0116 0.2499 0.0165 0.2957 0.0062 0.2318 0.0104
2002 0.3413 0.0213 0.3005 0.0129 0.2512 0.0184 0.3185 0.0069 0.2391 0.0116
2003 0.3707 0.0235 0.3241 0.0142 0.2625 0.0203 0.3453 0.0077 0.2508 0.0128
2004 0.4009 0.0258 0.3419 0.0156 0.2734 0.0222 0.3671 0.0084 0.2610 0.0140
2005 0.4361 0.0280 0.3710 0.0169 0.2920 0.0242 0.4012 0.0091 0.2816 0.0152
2006 0.4762 0.0303 0.4038 0.0183 0.3186 0.0261 0.4351 0.0098 0.3058 0.0164
2007 0.4919 0.0324 0.4122 0.0196 0.3270 0.0281 0.4510 0.0106 0.3176 0.0176
age 0.0100 0.0032 0.0284 0.0016 0.0416 0.0021 0.0122 0.0009 0.0364 0.0015
age2 -0.0210 0.0027 -0.0348 0.0008 -0.0454 0.0008 -0.0211 0.0006 -0.0366 0.0008
Gymnasium 0.0021 0.0302 -0.0061 0.0195 -0.0110 0.0167 0.0108 0.0117 -0.0408 0.0166
University -0.2830 0.0388 -0.1388 0.0208 -0.2824 0.0193 -0.2422 0.0142 -0.3082 0.0204
age*gymna 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0012 0.0003
Age*univer 0.0083 0.0009 0.0055 0.0004 0.0098 0.0005 0.0071 0.0003 0.0084 0.0003
Big city 0.0119 0.0082 0.0311 0.0036 0.0273 0.0042 0.0066 0.0037 0.0232 0.0052
Medium cit 0.0034 0.0053 0.0048 0.0028 -0.0060 0.0031 0.0038 0.0023 -0.0032 0.0032
# children -0.0093 0.0022   0.0011 0.0007 0.0052 0.0009
children 0- -0.0115 0.0049   -0.0142 0.0014 0.0048 0.0014
children 3- -0.0038 0.0031   -0.0022 0.0011 0.0045 0.0012
children 7-  -0.0035 0.0018   0.0020 0.0008 0.0040 0.0009
Constant 4.2212 0.0915 3.7833 0.0532 3.4727 0.0627 4.1713 0.0350 3.2226 0.0544
sigma_u 0.2183 0.1728 0.2081 0.2136 0.2764
sigma_e 0.0780 0.0819 0.1021 0.0782 0.1019  
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Table 5. Estimated taxable income parameters 
Single Married Cohab
Single Mother female male Female Male
Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
lw Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Net-of-tax 0.4192 0.0144 0.4875 0.0085 0.4396 0.0064 0.0442 0.0048 0.1153 0.0042
Virtual 0.1119 0.0026 0.1009 0.0010 0.1018 0.0009 0.0809 0.0022 0.1447 0.0031
1994 0.0350 0.0054 0.0395 0.0028 0.0363 0.0035 -0.0097 0.0019 -0.0049 0.0023
1995 0.0010 0.0085 -0.0061 0.0040 0.0128 0.0053 -0.0220 0.0031 -0.0063 0.0036
1996 0.0394 0.0118 0.0183 0.0056 0.0356 0.0074 -0.0062 0.0043 0.0087 0.0050
1997 0.0574 0.0152 0.0333 0.0071 0.0501 0.0095 0.0036 0.0055 0.0215 0.0064
1998 0.0626 0.0184 0.0470 0.0087 0.0561 0.0116 0.0042 0.0067 0.0188 0.0078
1999 0.0798 0.0216 0.0555 0.0103 0.0461 0.0136 0.0135 0.0079 0.0182 0.0092
2000 0.0718 0.0250 0.0645 0.0118 0.0625 0.0157 0.0105 0.0091 0.0263 0.0106
2001 0.0837 0.0283 0.0777 0.0134 0.0726 0.0178 0.0180 0.0104 0.0319 0.0120
2002 0.0667 0.0316 0.0608 0.0150 0.0469 0.0199 0.0065 0.0116 0.0154 0.0135
2003 0.0700 0.0350 0.0639 0.0165 0.0330 0.0219 -0.0091 0.0128 0.0027 0.0149
2004 0.0704 0.0383 0.0653 0.0181 0.0259 0.0240 -0.0233 0.0140 -0.0038 0.0163
2005 0.0625 0.0416 0.0569 0.0197 0.0169 0.0261 -0.0300 0.0152 -0.0033 0.0177
2006 0.0671 0.0449 0.0749 0.0213 0.0282 0.0282 -0.0292 0.0164 -0.0057 0.0192
2007 0.0379 0.0483 0.0378 0.0229 0.0015 0.0303 -0.0467 0.0177 -0.0169 0.0206
age 0.0447 0.0045 0.0643 0.0018 0.0734 0.0023 0.0511 0.0015 0.0545 0.0017
age2 -0.0184 0.0035 -0.0482 0.0008 -0.0575 0.0008 -0.0249 0.0009 -0.0340 0.0009
Gymnasium -0.0395 0.0427 0.0314 0.0215 0.0893 0.0187 -0.0416 0.0185 0.0333 0.0180
University -0.3152 0.0546 -0.0675 0.0230 -0.1546 0.0225 -0.2025 0.0216 -0.1883 0.0221
age*gymna 0.0015 0.0010 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0003
Age*univer 0.0113 0.0012 0.0051 0.0005 0.0083 0.0005 0.0061 0.0004 0.0062 0.0004
Big city 0.0469 0.0122 0.0911 0.0046 0.0587 0.0046 0.0154 0.0057 0.0444 0.0057
Medium cit 0.0045 0.0083 0.0142 0.0035 0.0003 0.0033 0.0029 0.0036 0.0033 0.0035
# children -0.0359 0.0030   -0.0058 0.0011 0.0091 0.0010
children 0- -0.1198 0.0075   -0.1373 0.0023 -0.0048 0.0015
children 3- -0.0206 0.0041   -0.0456 0.0016 -0.0015 0.0013
children 7-  -0.0162 0.0023   -0.0256 0.0012 0.0018 0.0010
Constant 9.7271 0.1339 9.6362 0.0618 9.6761 0.0688 9.4884 0.0600 9.1078 0.0698
sigma_u 0.2925 0.3553 0.3477 0.4786 0.3889
sigma_e 0.1017 0.1009 0.1119 0.1242 0.1171  
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Table 6. Wage and Taxable income Elasticities for different specifications 
Wage
Baselin
e fixed 
effects
Random 
effects
Fixed 
effects 
Lag W
Rando
m 
effects 
lag W
Rando
m 
effects  
Initial 
W
Rando
m 
effects  
Initial 
W 
Deciles
Random 
effects  
Initial W 
Deciles 
Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Single
Mother
Net-of-tax 0.093 0.140 0.081 0.100 0.094 0.095 0.088
Virtual income 0.024 0.038 0.019 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.023
Females
Net-of-tax 0.141 0.191 0.088 0.116 0.154 0.153 0.149
Virtual income 0.027 0.037 0.017 0.022 0.030 0.030 0.023
Males
Net-of-tax 0.159 0.241 0.119 0.150 0.178 0.182 0.159
Virtual income 0.038 0.056 0.025 0.033 0.042 0.043 0.038
Married/cohab
Females
Net-of-tax 0.010 0.016 0.007 0.017 0.007 0.007 0.009
Virtual income 0.020 0.029 0.011 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.017
Males
Net-of-tax 0.050 0.069 0.035 0.040 0.035 0.034 0.065
Virtual income 0.058 0.083 0.035 0.041 0.058 0.058 0.072
Taxable incom Baseline
Single
Mother
Net-of-tax 0.419 0.495 0.340 0.350 0.409 0.408 0.361
Virtual income 0.112 0.135 0.089 0.094 0.112 0.111 0.095
Females
Net-of-tax 0.488 0.560 0.345 0.382 0.485 0.483 0.403
Virtual income 0.101 0.117 0.072 0.081 0.102 0.101 0.074
Males
Net-of-tax 0.440 0.516 0.352 0.384 0.430 0.433 0.350
Virtual income 0.102 0.120 0.076 0.083 0.100 0.100 0.079
Married/cohab
Females
Net-of-tax 0.044 0.054 0.037 0.041 0.039 0.038 0.038
Virtual income 0.081 0.090 0.058 0.050 0.073 0.070 0.061
Males
Net-of-tax 0.115 0.131 0.086 0.076 0.087 0.085 0.101
Virtual income 0.145 0.168 0.110 0.099 0.126 0.124 0.131  
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Table 7. Effects on the central governmental budget on a reduced state tax 
 
Macro (billion SEK) Static Labor Supply Effort Total 
Effect 
    
    
Disposable income 17,6 7,3 2,0 26,9 
Labor income 0 11,1 3,4 14,6 
          
Tax -17,6 3,6 1,4 -12,6 
          
VAT (17,6 % of disposable 
income) 
3,1 1,3 0,3 4,7 
Pay roll taxes (31,42 % of 
labour income) 
0 3,5 1,1 4,6 
 Budget effect -14,5  8,4  2,9  -3,3 
 Self financing (percent)   58 20 78 
Employment (number of 
whole-year equivalences) 
0 27 598 0 27 598 
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Appendix 
Replicating the wage elasticities in Blomquist and Selin 
As mentioned above, our estimates deviate from the ones presented in Blomquist and Selin, 
especially for the females - strong incentive effects in Blomquist and Selin compared to 
essentially zero effects in our study. The main differences between our paper and Blomquist 
and Selin are the covered time period, the size of the sample as well as the choice of 
instruments. In order to make our results as comparable as possible, we include two time 
periods, 1997 and 2007 and use the same method for selecting instruments. However, there 
still remain important differences - different time period, sample size and source of 
information used for defining hourly wages.  
 Blomquist and Selin derive the following statistical model, including parameters γ0, γ1, 
γ2 and γ3. ln �Wi1991Wi1981� = γ0 + γ1 ln �1 − τi19911 − τi1981� + γ2 ln �Mi1991Mi1981� + γ03Xi1981 + f(lnTLIı�����) + (εi1991
− εi1981) 
The parameters γ1 and γ2 corresponds to the wage elasticity with respect to net-of-tax and 
virtual income. 
 Our estimates of this model produce elasticities approximately similar to our earlier 
results. However our estimates are much lower than the results in Blomquist and Selin. There 
are many possible explanation of this discrepancy - one important is that our time period does 
not include the major tax reform 1991.  
 
Table A1. A comparison of wage elasticities 
Elasticiteter Blomquist and Selin Ericson and Flood
Cohab Male
Net-of-tax rate 0,150*** 0,048***
Virtual income 0,007 0,135***
Number of observations 586 3687
Cohab females
Net-of-tax rate 0,451** 0,011
Virtual income -0,001 0,033***
Number of observations 522 5 188
Single male
Net-of-tax rate 0,153***
Virtual income 0,044***
Number of observations 1 243
Single females
Net-of-tax rate 0,069***
Virtual income 0,033***
Number of observations 2 162  
